We examine the extent of policy experimentation under decentralization and centralization. More specically, we study the incentive for experimentation in an environment where there is uncertainty about the payo of policies as well as the competence of policymakers. Voters form beliefs about the policymakers upon observing noisy signals. Policymakers are concerned about their reputation to the voters, where in the worst case, they are voted out. In equilibrium, policymakers adopt a greater variety of policies under decentralization than under centralization. This rationalizes the popular notion of policy laboratories. We also examine the welfare value of information on policies (policy learning) and on policymakers (electoral accountability). We show that district homogeneity is an important factor in determining voter welfare. In particular, decentralization delivers greater welfare than centralization when the districts are homogeneous, while the reverse holds when the districts are heterogeneous.
Introduction
Experimentation in public policy can have enormous consequences. In the documentary Commanding Heights, Margaret Thatcher recalls:
I remember the foreign minister and the nance minister from another country saying to me: You are the rst prime minister who has ever tried to roll back the frontiers of socialism. We want to know what's going to happen. Because if you succeed others will follow.
In the United States, Oates (1999) notes that since the dawn of the nation, programs successfully developed at the state level have often provided models for subsequent federal programs. For example, unemployment insurance was rst introduced in Wisconsin before being adopted nation wide through the Social Security Act in 1935. More recently, the 2006 health care reform in Massachusetts served as the blueprint for the Aordable Care Act.
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Many scholars attribute the experience of the U.S. to its having a federal system. In a famous remark, Justice Brandeis depicts states as laboratories of democracy, where novel social and economic experiments [can be conducted] without risk to the rest of the country.
This belief was one of the driving forces behind the decentralization of the welfare programs in the 1990s, when many welfare decisions were transferred from the federal government to the states.
2 Despite the popularity of the view that decentralization creates policy laboratories, there is not much analysis on what motivates state or local governments to experiment. A typical discussion hints at a rather romanticized view that policymakers act in the public's interest. To students of political economy, the notion of benevolent governments is rather unsatisfactory.
3
In this paper, we show how concerns for reputation together with reelection pressure can motivate policymakers to experiment more under decentralization than under centralization.
In particular, we consider a setting where there is uncertainty about both the competence of policymakers and the outcome (or payo ) of policies. Voters decide whether to retain or replace the incumbent policymaker upon observing signals in the form of district outputs 1 There are several empirical studies on policy diusion both across states and from states to the federal government. See Karch (2007) for a review of this literature.
2 See Volden (1997) for a discussion. 3 One problem being that if subnational governments are concerned with the welfare of their own constituency, then they may have less incentive to experiment than the federal government because of free-riding. The issue of free riding is the central focus of several papers on policy experimentation (see Section 1.1).
that confound the incumbent's competence and the policy outcome. The incumbent's payo depends on the voters' beliefs about him, (i.e., his reputation), where the worst outcome is being voted out of oce. We study two systems of governance. Under centralization, a central policymaker, such as the federal government, chooses policies in multiple districts.
Under decentralization, district policymakers, such as the state governments, choose policies independently. Our main result shows that given a menu of policies that are equally desirable ex-ante, district policymakers would implement dierent policies across districts, whereas the central policymaker would adopt the same policy for all districts. In other words, policy experimentation, as measured by the variety of policies tried, is greater under decentralization than under centralization.
Our result rests on the observation that the nature of the incumbent's payo induces riskseeking behavior. More specically, while the policymaker reaps rewards from having a high reputation, his payo from having a low reputation is bounded below; being voted out is the worst possible punishment. This payo structure is similar to a compensation scheme with bonuses and limited liability, which is known to encourage risk-taking in contract theory.
4
Intuitively, such a compensation structure insulates the agent from failure, but rewards the agent for success. In the context of our model, the policymakers seek risk by adopting policies that maximize the variance of the signals used for voter inference.
5 To put it dierently, the policymakers prefer policies that minimize the informativeness of the signals.
To see the implication of risk-seeking on policymaking, one has to consider how the set of district policies (policy prole for short) aects the information on policymakers. Under centralization, outputs in all districts are informative of the central incumbent's competence.
Moreover, if the district policies were the same (uniform policies), then there would be greater correlation between district outputs relative to the case where district policies are dierent (diverse policies). This means that the informativeness of district outputs on the incumbent is less under uniform policies than under diverse policies. Given the desire to minimize voters' information, the central incumbent would want to adopt uniform policies. Under decentralization, correlations between district outputs improve the quality of information on a given district's policymaker. Intuitively, when the district outputs are correlated, the voter in a given district can obtain more information on the district incumbent from outputs in other districts. It follows that district incumbents would like to adopt diverse policies to preclude voters from using this type of relative performance evaluation.
4 See Bannier, Feess and Packham (2012) for example. 5 Recall that the policymakers' payo is determined by their reputation.
In addition to providing a microfoundation for the notion of the laboratories of democracy, our welfare analysis yields novel insights. We divide the evaluation of welfare into two separate parts: policy learning and electoral accountability. The former measures the quality of information on policies, while the latter measures the quality of information on policymakers.
We show that the homogeneity of districts is an important determinant of policy learning.
In particular, decentralization induces greater policy learning than centralization if and only if the districts are suciently homogeneous. We show that centralization induces greater electoral accountability than decentralization. This is driven by the fact that in equilibrium, outputs in all districts are informative of the competence of the central policymaker, while the competence of a district policymaker can be inferred only from the output of his own district.
We show that the total welfare, as the aggregate of policy learning and electoral accountability, is greater under decentralization when districts are suciently homogeneous. This observation serves as a counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that decentralization is superior to centralization when districts are heterogeneous.
6 The contrast between our results and the conventional wisdom reects the dierence in focus. We consider welfare from the perspective of information and learning in an environment with incomplete information, while the formal argument behind the conventional wisdom is about preference matching.
7
Thus, our normative analysis contributes to the discussion of centralization vs. decentralization by pointing out a novel tradeo between voters' information and preference matching.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we discuss the relevant literature below; Section 2 sets up the model; Section 3 characterizes policy experimentation in equilibrium under centralization and under decentralization; Section 4 discusses voter welfare in terms of policy learning and electoral accountability; Section 5 explores various extensions of the model. We show, among other things, how the nature of the incumbent's payo can arise endogenously in a dynamic setting (see Section 5.1). We also show that our results are robust even when voters suer from various biases in probabilistic judgment (see Section 5.6); Section 6 concludes.
6 Lockwood (2005) provides a good summary of this view. 7 The argument goes that decentralization allows for a better match between local preference and public policies (e.g. public goods).
Related Literature
Various papers have examined the connection between decentralization and policy experimentation. The pioneering work of Rose-Ackerman (1980) argues that when policy experimentation is costly, decentralization creates free-riding and leads to less experimentation.
The free-riding argument also plays a central role in several other papers (see Strumpf, 2002 , Cai and Treisman, 2009 , and Callander and Harstad, 2015 . While some of these papers (e.g. Strumpf (2002) and Callander and Harstad (2015) ) identify certain circumstances when decentralization leads to greater policy experimentation, their results rely on the policy uniformity assumption (see discussion below). We do not impose such an assumption. More important, the incentive of policymakers in those models is directly tied to the benet and cost of policies, where as we focus on how career or reputation concerns aect policymakers'
incentives.
There are several papers that consider policy experimentation from perspectives other than free-riding. Kollman, Miller and Page (2000) compare centralized search vs. decentralized search. They show that the latter is more ecient when the complexity of the search problem is intermediate. Aghion and Jackson (2015) consider how career concerns aect policymakers' incentive to take risky actions. However, for comparative statics, they examine the eect of voter commitment and term limit on risk-taking. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) study policy experimentation and decentralization in an environment with asymmetric information about politicians' type. The politicians care about reelection and also directly the outcome of the policies. They show that decentralization leads to greater policy experimentation if the experimental policies have low probability of success.
It is worth noting that our main result can be seen as a way to endogenize the so-called policy uniformity assumption frequently used in the literature on scal federalism. The assumption imposes that the central government must adopt the same policy across districts. As far as we are aware, Kessler (2014) is the only other paper that seeks to endogenize policy uniformity as an equilibrium outcome. She approaches this problem by studying information transmission (e.g., cheaptalk) in the legislature.
Our paper is also related to the literature on electoral accountability. Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) study the link between electoral accountability and decentralization within a public goods provision setting. They argue that centralization is worse for electoral accountability.
8 The key to their argument is that the central government 8 Seabright (1996) considers electoral accountability in terms of the disciplining eect. He also argues that only needs the approval of a majority of districts. In our paper, we do not take on the issue of miscoordination between district voters. 9 We focus on how electoral accountability depends on the quality of information on the policymakers. Our result on electoral accountability is similar in spirit to certain observations made by Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) , who argue that centralization provides better information regarding the quality of the politicians. The way we model policymakers' concerns for reputation follows from the career concerns literature (e.g. Holmström (1999) ; Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) ). Moreover, our main results rest on the observation that limited liability induced by elections creates risktaking incentive for the policymakers. Previous papers such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990) , Holmström (1999), and Zwiebel (1995) have studied the issue of risk attitude and career concerns in various settings. The information and incentive structure in those papers mostly induce conservative behaviors from agents. However, Holmström (1999) does point out that to for managers to take risks, [a] stock option could be a more valuable incentive, since it removes the downside risk. In our paper, the nature of the policymakers' payos has the same spirit as the option compensation suggested by Holmstrom.
The Model
Consider an economy with two districts, d ∈ {x, y}. Each district has a representative voter. There are two experimental policies, a and b, with unknown payos. A policy is implemented in each district by a policymaker, whose competence is also unknown. In what follows, we will frequently refer to the policymakers as incumbents.
We consider two systems of governance:
• Centralization: There is one central policymaker. The policymaker chooses possibly dierent policies for the two districts.
• Decentralization: There is a policymaker for each district. The policymaker in each district independently chooses policies for his own district.
Centralization captures the governance structure of unitary states such as France and United Kingdom. Decentralization, on the other hand, corresponds to the governance structure of federalist states, such as the United States and Canada.
electoral accountability is reduced under centralization. 9 In fact, the district voters in our model act in unison under centralization.
All players share a common prior on policymakers' competence.
10 Under centralization, the competence of the central policymaker, θ, is assumed to be drawn from the normal distribution N (0, v θ ). While under decentralization, the competence of the district policymakers, θ x and θ y , are two independent draws from N (0, v θ ).
There is a also a common prior on the outcomes of policies. Let d p denote the payo of policy p in district d. We assume that the payos of dierent policies are independent draws from the standard normal N (0, 1). 
where ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the correlation coecient. We interpret ρ as the measure of district homogeneity. More specically, it captures the similarity of various unobserved factors, such as public preferences and the level of economic development, which determine the outcome of a policy. Thus, the greater the similarity of those factors in the two districts, the greater correlation between the outcomes under the same policy.
The payo of the policy together with the competence of the incumbent determines the output in each district. Let c d denote that output of district d, we have:
where θ = θ x = θ y under centralization. After observing only the district outputs, c ≡ {c
12 the voter in each district decides whether to retain the incumbent or to replace him with a challenger. More specically, there is a national election under centralization, and there are two independent district elections under decentralization. We assume that the challenger's competence is a new draw from the prior described above, and voters elect the candidate with the higher expected competence. It can be easily shown that the voter's preference conforms with utility maximization in a two-period version of the model (see 10 In other words, there is symmetric uncertainty. This is standard in career concerns models, see Holmström (1999) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) for example. 11 It is without loss of generality to normalize the variance to 1. 12 We assume that incumbents' actions are unobservable to voters. This implies essentially that voters do not detect deviations from (announced) policies. This may be the case when the actual implementation and enforcement of policies are not transparent. This assumption is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.5. Footnote 25) . The voter's strategy (the electoral rule) is denoted as:
which takes the value of 1 if she reelects the incumbent, and 0 otherwise. The incumbent's payos depend on the realized district outputs in two regards. First, if the voter decides to replace the incumbent given the realized outputs, the incumbent obtains an outside option normalized to zero. Second, the incumbent's payo conditional on reelection (his in-oce payo ) depends on the realized outputs. Formally, the incumbents have the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
For now, we leave the exact form of w (·) unspecied, though for much of the analysis later on, w(·) is a function of the incumbent's reputation. For example, following the convention in the career concerns literature (e.g., Holmström, 1999) , one can set w (c) = E voter [θ|c] , where E voter denotes the voter's posterior expectation.
To summarize our model, the sequence of events is as follows:
Nature draws the competence of incumbents and the outcome of policies Incumbents choose policies.
Voters observe district outputs and make reelection decisions.
Incumbents obtain payo u(c).
We examine pure strategy equilibria of this game.
Analysis
We begin our equilibrium analysis by establishing some observations regarding the strategic incentives of the voters and the incumbents that hold for general in-oce payo, w(c). We will then proceed to characterize the equilibrium policy prole given a specic formulation of w(c).
Voters: Voters form posterior beliefs about the incumbent upon observing outputs c = {c x , c y }. The voter would reelect the incumbent if the posterior expectation of his competence is greater than the expected competence of the challenger, which is 0.
13 Slightly abusing the notation, let θ stand for the competence of the incumbent in a given election. We can express the optimal electoral rule λ * (c) as:
where E voter denotes the voter's posterior expectation. · s c and variance
. Note both cov (θ, s c ) and var (s c ) would would be dierent depending on whether the policies are (believed to be) the same or dierent between districts.
13 Recall that we assumed the challenger's competence is described by the prior. 14 Recall that the voter does not observe policy choices, and therefore her inference cannot depend on it. 
The correlation between c after some algebra, one obtains that:
One can verify that those two moments is the same as the moments of θ|s d , thus proving s d is a sucient statistic for θ|c.
Note that doing this way is equivalent to do the following: rst get the posterior of x using c y as signal, and then calculate the posterior of θ x based on c
x taking into account the new prior of
x . Note also, that s d is indeed a sucient statistic for θ|c, i.e., θ
Note that when the district outputs are correlated, voters' inference on the district incumbent depends on the relative dierence between the district outputs. This can be interpreted as a form of relative performance evaluation (RPE ) and yard-stick competition (e.g., Shleifer, 1985 and Case, 1995b) . However, as we shall show below, the district incumbents have the incentive to choose policies that result in uncorrelated district outputs, thus rendering the idea of RPE or yard-stick competition irrelevant. This is in contrast with the typical models on RPE or yardstick competition, where the correlation between district outputs are assumed. Our equilibrium result suggests the possibility that the correlation between districts outputs can be small or non-existent when it can be manipulated through policy choices.
Having established some general observations regarding voters' strategic behavior, we shall now consider the incentive of the incumbents.
Incumbents: Recall that the incumbents payos depend on the district outputs in two ways.
First, voters' inference and therefore reelection depend on the realized outputs. Second, the incumbent's in-oce payo, w (c), is a function of the realized outputs. Given a particular inference rule by the voter, the incumbent's policy choice aects the distribution of district outputs and therefore his expected payo. Formally, given the electoral rule λ (c) ( 
where F (c|p) is the distribution of outputs c induced by policy prole p. Note that the incumbent's policy choice aects his payo only through the distribution of c, i.e., F (c|p).
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In Section 3.1 below, we characterize the equilibrium policy prole given a specic formulation of w(c):
In other words, the in-oce payo is the voter's posterior expectation of the incumbent's competence. We shall refer to this form of payos as the reputation payo. It captures the scenario that the incumbents care about the public's opinion, or that his reputation brings him material benet. Note that the reputation payo is found in typical career concerns models (e.g., Holmström, 1999 and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999) . We show that in equilibrium, the central policymaker chooses the same policy in both districts (uniform policies); while under decentralization, the district policymakers choose dierent district policies (diverse policies). In other words, policy experimentation, as measured by the variety of policies adopted, is greater under decentralization than under centralization.
Note that we focus on the reputation payo to simplify exposition and discussion; in Section 3.3 we show that our result goes through under more general specication of w(c).
Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium policy prole when the incumbents have the reputation payo, w(c) = E voter (θ|c). We will show that uniform policies is the equilibrium policy prole under centralization, while diverse policies is the equilibrium policy prole under decentralization.
Proposition 3.1. Under centralization, the central incumbent chooses the same policy for both districts in equilibrium. Under decentralization, the district incumbents choose dierent policies for the districts in equilibrium.
Proof. We rst discussion the case of centralization. Putting it all together, the incumbent's expected utility given a policy prole p = (p x , p y ) can be written as:
where F (s c |p) is the distribution of s c conditional on policy prole p. Now, for a normal
Observing that s c |p is a normal random variable with mean 0, we get that:
where σ (s c |p) is the standard deviation of s c |p.
As a best response to voter's strategy, the central incumbent chooses
. Note that the policy prole aects only σ (s c |p). Now, if p x = p y (uniform policies), then there is correlation between c x and c y through correlation between x p and y p .
In this case, it's easily shown that σ 2 (s c |p) 
It is straightforward to see, following the argument above, that given w (c) = v θ 1+2v θ · s c , the central incumbent maximizes his expected utility by choosing uniform policies. Therefore, voters' beliefs cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Now, we examine the equilibrium under decentralization. First, we show that diverse policies can be sustained in equilibrium. If the district voter believes that the policies are diverse, then she would treat only her own district's output as the only informative signal. And since the distribution of the own district's output is unaected by the policy choice, the districts incumbents have no incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. To show uniqueness, we need to prove that uniform policies cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Suppose policies were uniform, then Lemma 3.2 tells us that for the voter in district x (and analogously for the voter in district y):
y . Again, optimal electoral rule implies that the voter would reelect the incumbent if and only if s d ≥ 0. We can then write the incumbent's expected utility given policy prole p as:
Recall from the argument for the centralization case that´s
given uniform policies. It follows that the district incumbents' expected utility is greater under diverse policies than under uniform policies, and they have an incentive to deviate. Therefore, uniform policies cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Thus, we have shown that policy experimentation, as measured by the variety of policies adopted, is greater under decentralization than under centralization when incumbents have the reputation payo. Below, we expound the economic forces behind this result.
Discussion
We shall describe the intuition behind Proposition 3.1 in two steps. We rst show that the nature of the incumbents' payos induces them to favor policy proles that reduce the accuracy of voter inference. To see this, observe that the incumbent's payo, u (c), can be written as a function of some sucient statistic, s.
18 Moreover, if the sucient statistic,s, is above a certain threshold, the incumbent obtains in-oce payo w(s) that is positive and increasing in s; if s falls below the threshold, the incumbent obtains zero payo. This feature is reminiscent of a compensation scheme involving bonuses and limited liability. It has been observed in the contract theory literature that such compensation schemes induce risktaking behavior.
19 Intuitively, such compensation structure insulates the agent from failure, but rewards the agent for success. In our model, the incumbent takes risks by choosing the policy prole that maximizes the variance of the payos, u(s), or equivalently, the variance of the sucient statistic,s.
20 The incumbent's desire for risk can also be described as a desire to reduce the accuracy of voter inference. Intuitively, the variance of s is negatively related with its informativeness. It should be noted that the incumbent's tendency for risk-taking arises under a broader class of incumbents' payos (see Section 3.3 below). More important, we can show that the essential features of such payos arise naturally in a dynamic setting (see Section 5.1).
Having established the risk-taking tendency of the incumbents, it remains to see how this manifests in terms of policy choices. We shall examine, with in each system of governance, how dierent policy proles aect the variance of the relevant sucient statistic. Recall that under centralization, the average of district outputs serves as the sucient statistic for the central incumbent's competence. It is straightforward to see that the variance of the average of two random variables is increasing in their correlation. Thus, the central incumbent has the incentive to choose uniform policies over diverse policies, since the former 18 The optimal electoral rule, as explained in Section 3, is a function of the sucient statistic. Also, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1, one can rewrite w (c) as a linear function of the sucient statistic induced by voters' inference rule.
19 See Gollier, Koehl and Rochet (1997) for a theoretical treatment of this issue. There are also some empirical works on the topic. For example, Esty (1998) provides evidence that limited liability induces commercial banks to hold more risky assets. Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) , nds that corporate executives' holdings of stock options is positively correlated with their risk-taking. 20 For normal random variables, variance captures the notion of riskiness as dened by second order stochastic dominance. More specically, if two normal random variable a and b have the same mean but a has a greater variance than b, then a is more risky than b in the sense that b second order stochastically dominates a.
induces more correlation in the district outputs than the latter.
21 This results in uniform policies in equilibrium.
For decentralization, we need to discuss the case of uniform policies and diverse policies separately, since they induce dierent forms of sucient statistics. First, uniform policies implies that the sucient statistic the competence of a particular district incumbent is a weighted dierence between the district outputs. It is straightforward to see that the variance of this dierence is decreasing in the correlation between the district outputs. This means that the district incumbents have the incentive to deviate and choose diverse policies, which increase the variance of the sucient statistic by reducing the correlation between the outputs. Therefore, uniform policies cannot be sustained in equilibrium. To see that diverse policies can be sustained in equilibrium, note rst that such a policy prole implies that the district outputs are independent. Therefore, the sucient statistic for the competence of a district incumbent is simply his district's output. Because the payos of the two policies have the same prior distribution, the distribution of a district's output is the same under both policies. This means that the district incumbents have no incentive to deviate, and diverse policies can be sustained in equilibrium.
In the following section, we show that our equilibrium characterization holds under more general forms of incumbents' payos. For example, we show that our result holds under more general versions of the reputation payo.
Generalization
In Section 3.2 above, we argued that the key force behind our result is the incumbents' risk-seeking behavior. Moreover, we provided some intuition on how this is induced by certain features of the incumbents' payos. In this section, we study rigorously the connection between the nature of the incumbents payos and their risk-seeking behavior. As a consequence, we show that our characterization of equilibrium would hold more generally. For example, our result would go through so long as the in-oce payo, w(c), is an increasing function of the incumbent's reputation, E voter (θ|c).
For Lemma 3.3 below, we consider a Vn-M utility function v that encapsulates the benchmark utility function u described in (1). We provide two sucient conditions on v such that riskseeking behavior would arise.
21 Recall that uniform policies induce a positive correlation between the policy payos, then E [v(s) ] is increasing in the variance of s.
Proof. For the rst bullet point, we need to show that:
2σ 2 . This can be proved by showing that
Clearly, when c ≥ σ the above inequality holds, since each quantity in the integrand is positive. Now, suppose 0 ≤ c < σ, then
The equation after the rst inequality utilizes both the condition that s > 0, so that s 2 σ 2 −1 < 0 for all 0 < s < σ, and the condition that w(s) is an increasing function of s. Finally, because c ≥ 0, the quantity´s >c f (s)ds = 1 − F (c) would be increasing in σ. This justies the last inequality.
For the second bullet point, we only have to check the case that c < 0, since the case of c ≥ 0 is already covered by the rst bullet point. To begin, we can write:
where the rst equality uses the symmetry of the normal distribution. Note that A = −c<s<c
The linearity of w(·) and the symmetry of the normal distribution imply that´− c<s<c
Note that the quantity F (c) − F (−c) is decreasing in σ, and thus A is increasing in σ. Now for s > |c|, one can simplify µ(s) = w(s) − 2w(c) = w(s) > 0. Note now that as the variance of s increases, the quantity B increases based on the argument set out in the rst bullet point. Thus, it can be shown that E [v(s)] is increasing in the variance of s.
In our benchmark model, the sucient statistic used for voters' inference (e.g., s c ) plays the role of s, while the electoral rule λ plays the role of the threshold c.
22 It is straightforward to see that the benchmark utility function u (c) given the optimal electoral rule satises the rst condition in Lemma 3.3. In particular, the posterior expectation of competence is always an increasing function in the relevant sucient statistic, and the incumbents receive the worst possible payo in the case of being replaced. Lemma 3.3 can be used to show that our characterization of equilibrium holds under a broader class of in-oce payos.
23 For example, the corollary below shows that our result holds if the in-oce payo is an increasing function of the incumbent's reputation.
22 In our benchmark model, the electoral rule can be expressed as a threshold rule on an appropriate sucient statistic. 23 The lemma is also used to establish results in Section 5.1 and 5.6. Proof. Note rst that if the in-oce payo w (c) > 0 is an increasing function of the sucient statistic used for voters' inference, then the rst condition in Lemma 3.3 is satised. It is straightforward to see that this statement in terms of the sucient statistic is equivalent to the condition stating that w is an increasing function of E voter (θ|c), which is itself an increasing function of the relevant sucient statistic. Thus, these conditions on w ensures that the incumbents prefer higher variance of the sucient statistic. To see that these conditions imply our equilibrium characterization, one can simply follow the second part of the discussion in Section 3.2. The argument would take a similar form as the proof of Proposition 3.1. We omit the details.
In the case where w(s) is linear, Lemma 3.3 allows for a relaxation of the limited liability assumption. In particular, our result continues to hold so long as the out-of-oce payo is point-wise greater than w(s) on the negative reals.
Corollary 3.2. Given two linear increasing function w(s) and z(s), dene v as:
Proposition 3.1 holds if z(c) = w(c) and
Proof. Note that the expression v(s)−z(s) satises the second bullet point in Lemma 3.3, and
is increasing in σ. As in Corollary 3.1, this observation is sucient for our equilibrium characterization. The detail is omitted for brevity.
Note that Corollary 3.2 implies that the equilibrium characterization Proposition 3.1 is also robust to asymmetric information. In particular, the result would not change even if the policymakers is aware of their types. This follows from the fact that knowing one's own type is equivalent to facing a positive or negative reelection threshold c. Given the linear nature of the in-oce payo in the benchmark model, Corollary 3.2 would imply that the location of the threshold does not aect the incumbent's incentive to take risks. It follows that the policy choices would be the same as in the case of symmetric information.
It is interesting to note that Lemma 3.3 allows our result to go through under payos that are dierent in nature than the reputation payo. In previous drafts of the paper, we showed that our characterization of equilibrium would hold when the incumbents extract rents directly from the economy. Specically, for some 0 < κ, we dene the incumbents' in-oce payo as: w(c) = κ(c x + c y ) under centralization, and w(c) = κc d for the district d incumbent under decentralization. In other words, we let the incumbents extract for person consumption a fraction of the output that they are responsible for. Given this class of in-oce payos, one can prove directly that Proposition 3.1 goes through. Alternatively, one can observe that the Vn-M utility in this case would satisfy the second condition in Lemma 3.3.
In the next section, we examine the equilibrium welfare induced by the two systems. We consider two dimensions of welfare: policy learning and electoral accountability.
Welfare Analysis
In the previous section, we showed that policy experimentation, as measured by the variety of district policies, is greater under decentralization. In equilibrium, district outputs are informative of the incumbent's competence and the policy payo. A natural question to ask is how much do voters learn about the policymakers and policies from these signals. In what follows, we examine voter welfare that is induced by the quality of information on policies and on policymakers under the two systems. We shall refer to the two dimensions of welfare as policy learning and electoral accountability, respectively.
We dene the measure of policy learning as the ex-ante policy payo when the policy is chosen optimally based on realized outputs. Formally, letp = argmax {a,b} E d a |c , E d b |c be the optimal policy based on the observed outputs. We dene policy learning as
where r ∈ {c, d} denotes the system of governance (c stands for centralization, d for decentralization). The expectation is taken at the ex-ante stage, before the realization of the outputs.
We dene the measure for electoral accountability similarly as for policy learning. In particular, we measure electoral accountability by the ex-ante competence of the winner of the election:
where θ d 2 is the competence of the winner, and the expectation is taken at the ex-ante stage, before the realization of the outputs. Finally, we dene total welfare as the sum of policy learning and electoral accountability:
It is worth pointing out that the denition of policy learning and electoral accountability can be endogenized in a two-period extension of our model.
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In particular, the usual denition of welfare in the two-period model corresponds to our denition of W r .
Below, we show that policy learning and electoral accountability have monotonic relationships with the model parameters (e.g., district homogeneity). In particular, decentralization induces greater policy learning than centralization if the districts are suciently homogeneous or if the prior uncertainty about policymakers is suciently low. For electoral accountability, centralization outperforms decentralization, though the dierence is decreasing in district homogeneity. Overall, decentralization induces greater total welfare if district homogeneity is high. This result forms a sharp contrast with the existing literature on decentralization, which argues that decentralization is most suitable when districts are heterogeneous.
24 Recall that the electoral rule in the benchmark model chooses the best candidate based on observed outputs. 25 We add a second period to the benchmark model, where the period two output, c d 2 , is dened in the same manner as in period one, i.e., c d 2 is the sum of the competence of the elected policymaker and the payo of a chosen policy. We assume that the elected policymakers chooses policy prole optimally given realized outputs. This assumption is innocuous since the game ends in two periods and therefore policy choices in the second period have no eect on the payo of the policymakers. Note that the voter's preference for the candidate with the highest expected competence can be rationalized as utility maximizing behavior in this two-period model. More specically, suppose the voter chooses the electoral rule to maximize her payo, which we dene to be the expected sum of the outputs in the two periods, then the voter would adopt the same electoral rule as (2). The above observations imply that the equilibrium in this two-period model is consistent with the equilibrium in the benchmark model. Thus, we can follow the convention and dene voter welfare as the voter's ex-ante utility. Now, the fact that policies are ex-ante identical implies that the expected output in period 1 is zero under both policies. Thus, voter welfare is essentially the ex-ante expectation of period 2 output, which is simply W r .
Policy Learning
In this section, we examine policy learning under centralization and decentralization. Recall that we measure policy learning by
optimal policy based on the observed outputs. Due to the symmetry between the districts, we consider, without loss of generality, the extent of policy learning in district x. To simplify exposition, we will often drop the superscript d.
Intuitively, there are two factors that aect policy learning. First, the policy prole matters. Uniform policies provides high quality information for one policy, while diverse policies provide lower quality information on both policies.
26 Second, the quality of information on policymakers' competence matters. Since the district output is the sum of competence and policy payos, a reduction in the uncertainty about the incumbent's competence reduces the uncertainty about the policy payo. This eect favors centralization because as we shall see in Section 4.2, the quality of information on policymakers' competence is greater under centralization than under decentralization. The implications of the rst factor, on the other hand, depend on the model parameters. The analysis of policy learning starts with the lemma below, which provides an explicit formula for policy learning under the two systems.
Lemma 4.1. Policy learning under centralization is:
where A v θ + 1 + ρ.
And policy learning under decentralization is:
Proof. Under centralization, politician chooses the same policy across districts (assume it's a), thus rst period consumption c conveys information only about a and no information 26 With uniform policies (say a is chosen in both districts), there is correlation between policy outcomes. Therefore, outputs of both districts are informative of the outcome of policy a, but there is no information regarding b. On the other hand, diverse policies provides information regarding both policies, but this information is less precise since for each policy, there is only one observable signal (output in one of the districts). about policy b. The optimal choice of policy conditional on the realization of c is such that policy a is chosen in period 2 if and only if E [ a |c] ≥ 0. Thus, the policy learning is:
. Using Greene (2008)'s Theorem B.7, and let:
The theorem tells us that:
Now, we can substitute the above expression into V c and get:
Under decentralization, each district adopts a distinct policy. Without loss of generality, assume that policy a is implemented at district x and policy b at district y. The policy learning can be written as:
Since there is positive correlation between policy outcomes, rst period consumptions conveys information regarding both policies for district x. However, because the correlation between the policy outcomes is less than one, the voter in district x has less information about b 1 than a 1 . In particular, we have:
y and the ex-ante welfare for district x is therefore:
Given two normal random variable (possibly correlated), the expected value of the maximum of the two random variable can be computed (see Nadarajah and Kotz, 2008) . Thus, treating
and y ∼ N 0,
, and x is uncorrelated with y. And we get that E c [x, y] =
The relative dierence in policy learning between the two systems is ambiguous in general.
As an example, set v θ = 1, and we can simplify the expressions for V c and V d to:
It is clear from the expressions that for ρ close to 0, V c is greater than V d ; while for ρ close to 1, V d is greater than V c . Moreover, V c is decreasing in ρ, while V d is increasing in ρ. These observations imply the existence of a threshold on ρ such that the policy learning is greater under decentralization if and only if ρ is above the threshold. This claim turns out to hold more generally, as Proposition 4.1 below shows.
Proposition 4.1. There exists a threshold κ ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
• for ρ < κ ρ , policy learning is greater under centralization (i.e.,V c > V d );
• for ρ > κ ρ , policy learning is greater under decentralization (i.e., V d > V c );
• for ρ = κ ρ , policy learning the same under both systems (i.e.,V c = V d ).
Proof. It is clear from the expression V d that it is increasing in ρ. On the other hand, one can compute the derivative of 2πV 2 c with respect to ρ is − 2v 2 θ (1+2v θ +ρ) 2 < 0 . It follows that V c is decreasing in ρ. For ρ = 0, we can simplify the expressions:
, where as
. It follows that V c < V d . These two observations together with the result above regarding W 's being monotone in ρ mean that there exists some cut o κ ρ below which V c > V d , and above which V c < V d .
We now discuss the intuition for Proposition 4.1. To aid exposition, we assume policy a is implemented in both districts under centralization, while a is implemented in district x and b in district y under decentralization. We are going to consider policy learning from the perspective of the district x voter. Note rst that c x is informative of policy a under both centralization and decentralization. The two systems dier in terms of the information conveyed by c y . Under centralization, c y provides some additional information on policy a.
However, the extent of this additional information is decreasing in district homogeneity. In the extreme case of ρ = 1, c y contains no information about policy a beyond what's already conveyed by c x . Under decentralization, c y is informative of policy b, and the informativeness of c y is increasing in district homogeneity. Intuitively, the more similar the districts, the more similar the eect of a particular policy on the outputs in both districts. Therefore, the output in district y, which depends on policy b, provides more information about the (potential) outcome of policy b in district x when the districts are more homogeneous.
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27 Similar observations have appeared in other works. Callander and Harstad (2015) and Kollman, Miller and Page (2000) argue that the outcome of a policy experiment in another district is more informative to one's own district if the policy preferences are similar. Volden (1997 Volden ( , 2006 provide some empirical evidence that supports this argument. He shows that policies tend to diuse across states that are similar.
Summarizing the discussions above, we see that when the districts are highly homogeneous, there is approximately equal amount of information on policy a under both systems, but decentralization provides more information regarding policy b than centralization. Therefore, we can conclude that policy learning is greater under decentralization when districts are suciently homogeneous. On the other hand, when districts are highly heterogeneous (i.e., 
Proof. LetṼ r 2πV 2 r for r = c, d . We have that:
We shall argue thatṼ c >Ṽ d , or equivalently |Ṽ c | < |Ṽ d |. First, notice that the inequality holds for v θ = 0. For notation simplicity, let the numerator/denominator for |Ṽ c (v θ = 0)| and |Ṽ d (v θ = 0)| be denoted a/b and c/d respectively. We can then write:
, and therefore, it must be the case that
. Thus, we have proven thatṼ c >Ṽ d . in district x. These observations mean that policy learning is greater under decentralization when v θ is suciently low.
Our results on policy learning is summarized in Figure 1 . It delineates regions in the parameter space (v θ and ρ) where decentralization induces more/less policy learning as compared to centralization.
Electoral Accountability
In this section, we examine electoral accountability under centralization and decentralization.
Recall that we dene electoral accountability as the ex-ante expectation of the competence of the policymaker selected by the electoral rule. More specically, let electoral accountability
Note that this is analogous to the denition of policy learning.
28 Again, due to the symmetry between the districts, we only consider electoral accountability in district x. First, we provide closed-form expressions for electoral accountability under the two systems.
28 We use the term electoral accountability to conform with the existing literature. 
and electoral accountability under decentralization is:
Proof. Using the law of iterated expectations, and conditional on the event that the incumbent is reelected (which is equivalent to the average outputs being above 0), and the event that he is replaced. We have:
We know that Pr c x +c y 2 ≥ 0 = 1 2 and E θ| c x +c y 2 ≥ 0 can be expressed explicitly using the formula for the expectation for the mean of a half-normal distribution. Putting it together,
Following the same argument above for U d , we have that:
It follows immediately from the expressions U c and U d that U c is greater than U d . Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.3. Electoral accountability is greater under centralization than under decentralization, strictly so for 0 < ρ < 1.
We now discuss the intuition behind Proposition 4.3. In particular, we shall consider the quality of voters' information on the incumbents under each system. Under centraliza- 29 The precision of the posterior distribution of the incumbent's competence can be written as:
It is straightforward to show that under centralization:
and under decentralization:
For ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have τ (θ|s c ) > τ (θ|c d ) and τ (θ|s c ) = τ (θ|c d ) at ρ = 1. Thus, voters obtain better information regarding the incumbent under centralization than under decentralization.
29 For centralization, θ is the competence of the national incumbent. For decentralization, θ is the competence of the incumbent for a given district.
It is worth noting that Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) make a similar observation.
They show that voters obtain better information on the bureaucrats when the bureaucrats are responsible for a wider range of tasks.
Similar to policy learning, electoral accountability is related to district homogeneity. Corollary 4.1 below shows that the dierence in electoral accountability between centralization and decentralization is decreasing in district homogeneity.
The proof is omitted as the result follows immediately from the expressions U c and U d . 
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Consider the extreme case of ρ = 1, observing both c x and c y provides no more information θ than observing c x alone, which is the case under decentralization. It follows that when ρ is suciently large, electoral accountability is the same under both systems.
It is worthwhile to relate our results on electoral accountability to the political economy literature on yardstick competition. Many papers (e.g., Belleamme and Hindriks, 2005; Besley and Case, 1995a; Besley and Coate, 2003; Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 2004) argue that decentralization leads to greater electoral accountability due to yardstick competition, which is exogenously imposed in those models. In our model, policymakers act strategically such that the output of a district is not informative of the incumbent in another under decentralization. In other words, yardstick competition is rendered invalid in equilibrium in our model. 30 This is veried by the fact that the expression (4) for voters' information under decentralization is independent of ρ. 
Total Welfare
Recall that we dene total welfare as the sum of policy learning and electoral accountability:
The results in Section 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that whether decentralization induces greater welfare than centralization depends on model parameters. Indeed, Proposition 4.4 below shows that total welfare is greater under decentralization if and only if districts are suciently homogenous, or if the prior uncertainty on policymakers' competence is suciently low.
Proposition 4.4. For a given v θ , there exists a thresholdρ (v θ ) such that:
• Total welfare is greater under decentralization (i.e.,
• Total welfare is greater under centralization (i.e.,
• Total welfare is equal under both systems if ρ =ρ (v θ ) .
Furthermore, for a given value of ρ, there exists v θ (ρ) such that the
Proof. The existence of the thresholdρ (v θ ) is implied by the fact that 1) there exists a similar threshold for policy learning (see Proposition 4.1 ) and 2) the dierence in electoral accountability U c − U d is decreasing in ρ and is 0 when ρ = 1 (see Corollary 4.1 ). For the second statement, note that there is a threshold on v θ such that policy learning is greater under decentralization if and only if v θ is less than the threshold (see Proposition 4.2). Moreover, it is straightforward to see from the expressions for U c and 32 Note that the region of (v θ , ρ)
in which decentralization induces greater total welfare lies within the region in which decentralization induces greater policy learning. This reects the fact that electoral accountability is weakly greater under centralization for all values of parameters.
32 Strictly speaking, we cannot prove that W c > W d for v θ > v θ (ρ). However, Figure 2 , which is derived from numerical solutions, suggests that it is the case. 33 In the context of our model, we consider welfare as a measure of voters' information and learning in an environment with incomplete information. Therefore, the contrast between our observation and the conventional wisdom reects a tradeo between preference matching and voters' information.
Heterogeneous districts suggest a need for policy exibility as provided by decentralization, but on the other hand, voters' information and learning would suer if uncertainties were present. This is an important factor for consideration when one evaluates the optimality of decentralization.
Extensions
We now explore several extensions of the model. In Section 5.1, we show that the incumbents' risk-seeking attitude arises endogenously in a dynamic setting. In Section 5.2, we show that district policymakers' incentive is unaected when they are motivated to run for higher oce.
33 See Lockwood (2005) ; Oates (1999) for a discussion.
In Section 5.3, we examine the connection between district homogeneity and the incentive of the policymakers. We then explore the robustness of our results to the presence of status quo policies (Section 5.4) and to observable incumbent actions (Section 5.5). Finally, we explore how much our results depend on voter rationality. We show that equilibrium characterization would hold even when voters suers from several well-known biases in probabilistic judgment
Endogenizing Incumbents' Payo
As noted in Section 3.2, a key determinant of the incentive of the policymakers is the nature of their payos. More specically, the incumbent's payo is zero if he is voted out of oce, and increasing in his reputation if he is reelected into oce. In this section, we show that this feature of his payo arise naturally when the incumbent takes into account the possibility of being in oce for multiple terms. More specically, we examine a dynamic model with multiple elections and show that the incumbent's continuation payo has the bonus and limited liability feature even when the static payo does not.
Consider a model of elections with T > 2 periods. As before, we assume that there is prior uncertainty about the policymakers' competence. In each period t, the voter observes a i.i.d. normal signal s t in the form of the sum of the incumbent's competence and some normal noise.
34 Let h t denote the set of signals observed up to date t. There is an election at the end of every period. We denote the voter's posterior belief about the incumbent at the time of the election as:
We assume the voter's objective is to maximize the expected sum of the competence of incumbent:
We dene the static payo for the incumbent as:
where λ t (·) is the electoral rule. Note that the static utility u(h t ) is not of the same nature as the payo in the benchmark model. In particular, the in-oce payo is constant and therefore the incumbent does not obtain bonuses for high realizations of the signals. One can show that if the payo in the benchmark model were of the same form as (5), then the policymakers in our benchmark model would not exhibit risk-seeking behavior. However, in 34 The equivalent of s t in our benchmark model would be the sucient statistics s c or s d . a dynamic setting as described above, the continuation payo for the incumbent does have the bonuses and limited liability nature as in the payo in the benchmark model (see Lemma 5.1). Moreover, we can show that for T = 3, the continuation payo satises the conditions in Lemma 3.3 and therefore the incumbent would seek risk as in the benchmark model.
We show in Lemma 5.1 below that the continuation payo of the incumbents exhibit the bonuses and limited liability feature when voters adopt optimal electoral rule. For simplicity, we focus on the continuation payo for the initial (date 1) incumbent, denoted as v(s 1 ).
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Lemma 5.1. The optimal electoral rule is a threshold rule with respect to s 1 . In particular, there exists some constant c such that λ(θ 1 ) = 1 if and only if s 1 ≥ c. And the resulting continuation payo for the initial incumbent is:
where w(s 1 ) is an increasing function.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the optimal electoral rule at any given date would necessarily have the following property: given the variance of σ [θ t |h t ], the electoral rule is a threshold rule with regard to
in s 1 , the voter would adopt a threshold rule s 1 at date 1, similar to that of the threshold model. Clearly, below the threshold, call it c, the continuation payo for the incumbent is 0. On the other hand, if s 1 is above the threshold, the continuation value would be positive, denote it w(s 1 ).
We shall now argue that w (s 1 ) is a strictly increasing function. This is equivalent to showing that the expected length of tenure is increasing in the realization of s 1 . Formally, the expected length of tenure is Proof. We shall rst show that the continuation value for the voter π(θ 1 ) is increasing in the mean and variance ofθ 1 , the competence of the second period incumbent prior to observing s 2 . This would then imply that for the election at the end of t = 1, the voter would choose a replacement if the posterior competence of the incumbent is non-positive, because the variance ofθ 1 is greater with a replacement than with the incumbent. Now, the continuation value π (s 1 ) can be written as:
where E θ 2 = E θ 1 |s 2 is the posterior expectation of the second period incumbent, and s 2 |θ 1 denotes the distribution of s 2 provided the competence component isθ 1 (it's not a conditional distribution). This expression relies on the fact that at the optimum, the voter reelect the period 2 incumbent if and only if his expected competence is above 0. Now, observe that prior to the realization of s 2 , the quantity E θ 2 is a normal random variable with mean E θ 1 . In fact, E θ 2 would be a weighted sum of s 2 and E θ 1 . Thus, the optimal reelection rule in period 2 implies that there is some constant c such that:
Treat max E θ 2 , 0 as v (s), we can apply the second bullet point of Lemma (3.3), and consequently π θ 1 is increasing in the variance of s 2 |θ 1 . Now, the variance of s 2 |θ 1 is 36 We do conjecture that the rst condition is satised in general.
increasing in the variance ofθ 1 , since s 2 is the sum ofθ 1 and some noise. Therefore, π θ 1 is increasing in the variance ofθ 1 . Finally, we want to show that π θ 1 is increasing in the mean ofθ 1 . It follows from the observation that E θ 2 , as a normal random variable, has mean E θ 1 , and therefore can be ranked according to E θ 1 in terms of rst order stochastic dominance. Thus, π θ 1 would be increasing in E θ 1 .
In sum, we have shown that the continuation payo for the voter, π(θ 1 ), is increasing in the mean and variance ofθ 1 . It follows that if the initial incumbent has posterior expectation less than 0 at the time of period 1 election, the voter would have a strict preference for replacement, whose competence has mean 0 and a greater variance. In other words, the threshold for reelection at t = 1 must be strictly positive, and we can apply the rst bullet of Lemma 3.3 to get our result.
Note that although we do not explicitly incorporate policy choices nor systems of governance into our dynamic model, the arguments in Section 3.2 implies that the policymakers' riskseeking behavior is sucient for the policy choices under each system to be the same as in our benchmark model. Interestingly, the incumbent's risk attitude may change during the course of his tenure.
37 Consider the case where the initial incumbent is reelected for period 2 oce, the posterior expectation of his competence is greater than 0. Note that this can be interpreted as a form of incumbency advantage, which has been studied widely.
38 Now, the optimal electoral rule for the period 2 election is to reelect the incumbent if and only if E θ 2 > 0. This means that the initial incumbent, if elected for period 2 oce, would prefer to reduce the variance of s 2 .
39 In other words, the initial incumbent would be risk averse in period 2. 37 We thank Scott Ashworth for pointing this out. 38 See Ashworth (2005) and citations within 39 The nature of the static payo implies that at period 2, the incumbent wants to maximize the probability of reelection. This probability is P r E θ 2 > 0 . Since E θ 2 is a normal random variable with mean E θ 1 > 0, the initial incumbent has the incentive to reduce the variance of E θ 2 , which is a weighted sum of E θ 1 and s 2 . It follows that the incumbent wants to reduce the variance of s 2 .
Higher-Oce Motivation 40
So far we have assumed that under decentralization, district incumbents are motivated to retain the district oce. However, in reality, local politicians often aspire to run for higher oces.
41 In this section, we examine the implications of this type of higher-oce motivation.
We show that the characterization of equilibrium policy prole remains as in the benchmark model. However, unlike in the benchmark model, decentralization induces greater electoral accountability than centralization.
To incorporate higher-oce motivation, we make the following modication to our benchmark model. We assume that under decentralization, there is an election for higher oce instead of local elections. The candidates for the election are the two district incumbents.
Note that since the modication aects only decentralization, it follows immediately that the equilibrium under centralization is unaected. Proposition 5.2 below shows that the equilibrium under decentralization remains the same as well.
Proposition 5.2. Diverse policies remain the equilibrium policy prole under decentralization in the presence of higher-oce motivation.
Proof. We will show that district x's incumbent (and analogously for district y's incumbent) has the incentive to decrease the correlation between the district outputs. Equilibrium behavior then follows from our discussion in Section 3.2. Note rst that because of symmetry, the voter will elect district x incumbent if and only if c x > c y . Let s c x −c y and conjecturing that policies are diverse, the expected utility for the incumbent can be written as:
where the rst inequality follows from the law of iterated expectations, and the second equality follows from the fact that E voter (θ|c
· c x . Now, since s and c
x are correlated normal random variables, we have that E [c
s. Noting that s ∼ 40 We thank Roger Myerson for suggesting this extension. 41 This is a setting found in many political economy papers, see Myerson (2006) and those cited within.
Clearly, the expression is decreasing in the covariance between x and y . The incumbents have an incentive to adopt diverse policies. This justies diverse policies as an equilibrium policy prole. Now, we need to show uniform policies cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Under uniform policies, the voter's posterior expectation is E voter (θ|c) =
, we can write the incumbents' expected payo as:
sdF (s|p). Since s is a normal random variable with mean 0, we have that the quantity´s >0
sdF (s|p) is increasing in the variance of s. It follows that the expected utility is greater under diverse policies than under uniform policies, and the incumbents would have an incentive to deviate from uniform policies.
It is straightforward to see that given equilibrium policy proles are unchanged, our observations regarding policy learning is robust to the higher-oce motivation.
42 The same goes with electoral accountability under centralization. However, electoral accountability under decentralization (i.e.,U d ) needs to be recomputed to account for the change in the nature of the election. In particular, the voters are selecting between two district incumbents instead of between the incumbent and an unknown challenger.
43 Consequently, voters have information on both candidates under decentralization. Proposition 5.3 shows that this results in greater electoral accountability than under centralization. It is worth noting that our result concurs with an observation by Myerson (2006) . He argues that the competition between local politicians for higher oce improves the selection of national leaders.
42 The denition of policy learning as described in Section 4.1 depends only on policy choices. 43 Formally, 
where the equality follows from the law of iterated expectations. The posterior expectations is a linear function of the signal:
Thus, one can rewrite the expression above as:
where according to Nadarajah and Kotz (2008) ,´c x ,c y max {c
And this quantity is clearly greater than the electoral accountability under centralization:
Incentive for Experimentation and District Homogeneity
Some existing papers have examined the relationship between district homogeneity and the incentive for experimentation. The conclusion, however, is mixed. For example , Callander and Harstad (2015) argue that when districts have similar tastes for policies, the experiment in one district would be of interest to other districts. This creates free-riding incentive and thus reduces the district policymakers' incentive for experimentation. Strumpf (2002) interprets district homogeneity similarly to us, and he nds that benevolent district policymakers would have greater incentive to adopt diverse policies if the districts are homogeneous.
In this section, we evaluate the eect of district homogeneity on the incentive for policy experimentation. To do so, we consider a simple extension to our benchmark model. In particular, we assume that the incumbents incur a additional cost if they adopt diverse policies. Formally, we add a cost term τ to the incumbent's Vn-M utility: Proof. Since under centralization, politician already has incentive to adopt the same policy, adding cost for diverse policies τ can only reinforce previous incentive. Hence it is straightforward to see that uniform policies remains the equilibrium outcome for centralization. This is true under either denition of w(s).
For decentralization, diverse policy is no longer an equilibrium for any positive values of τ .
Clearly, if the voter only pay attention to her own district's outcome, then the incumbent has incentive to choose uniform policies since doing so does not aect the distribution of own district output, but allows the incumbent to gain τ (relative to choosing diverse policies).
We shall show that uniform policies can be sustained as an equilibrium for suciently high τ . Recall in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we argued that under the conjecture that the policies are uniform, the incumbent can deviate to adopt diverse policy and get expected utility equal to A ·
for τ ≥ τ * where:
the cost for adopting diverse policies would be too great for the incumbents. In other words, the incumbents have no incentives to deviate and uniform policies can be sustained in equilibrium. Now, after some algebra, we can simplify τ * to be a constant multiple of the following expression:
It is straightforward to see that the expression (7) is an increasing function of ρ, and therefore so is τ * .
Proposition 5.4 can be understood by considering how district homogeneity aects the information on the incumbents induced by various policy proles under decentralization.
44 If uniform policies were adopted, the voter in a given district can obtain additional information on her district's incumbent from the other district's output (e.g. relative performance evaluation). Moreover, the greater the district homogeneity, the greater the correlation between district outputs. This results in more information on the district incumbents through RPE.
For diverse policies on the other hand, district homogeneity does not aect voter information since district outputs are independent. Therefore, an increase in district homogeneity increases the gap in information induced by uniform policies and diverse policies. Since the policymakers have a desire to reduce voter information, they have greater incentive to choose diverse policies over uniform policies when the districts are more homogeneous.
Status Quo Policies
In most existing papers on policy experimentation, a status quo policy, the payo of which is known, is available. In our model, having a status quo policy would not change equilibrium outcomes. Recall that our results are driven by policymakers' preference for variance to their payos. Since the outcome of a status quo policy has zero variance, the incumbents would prefer the experimental policies over status quo policies, assuming that the expected outcomes of both types of policies are similar. Thus, with regard to the equilibrium outcome, it is without loss of generality to exclude status quo policies from the set of available alternatives. Nonetheless, status quo policies would matter when considering welfare. For example, a status quo policy induces greater electoral accountability than experimental policies. This follows from the fact that status quo policies maximizes the information on the incumbents. 44 Recall that the incumbents policy choices are driven by their preference for risk, or equivalently, preference to reduce information.
In particular, district outputs under status quo policies perfectly reveal the competence of the incumbent.
Observability of Incumbents' Actions
So far we have assumed that the policy choices of the incumbents are unobservable to voters.
We interpret this as a lack of transparency in the formation or implementation of the policies.
While on equilibrium path, voters know the policy choices, the observability of actions has an eect on the formation of equilibrium. In particular, when the incumbents' actions are unobservable, the voter cannot adjust her inference in response to a deviation. Consider the case of decentralization, where dierent sucient statics are used by voters depending on their conjectures about the policy choices. Uniform policies cannot be sustained under decentralization because if the voters were to update their beliefs accordingly, the incumbents will have an incentive to deviate to choosing diverse policies.
In this section, we explore the implications to our results if policy choices were observable.
In other words, we study a Stackelberg game where the incumbents rst choose policies, and upon observing the policies, voters update their beliefs and make reelection decisions. We show that diverse policies is now the equilibrium policy prole under centralization while uniform policies is the equilibrium policy prole under decentralization.
Proposition 5.5. Diverse policies is the equilibrium policy prole under centralization, and uniform policies is the equilibrium policy prole under decentralization.
Proof. First, we will examine the case of centralization. Note given the reputation payos, · 1 2π under diverse policies. Therefore, the incumbent chooses uniform policies in equilibrium.
The intuition as to why the equilibrium outcomes are can be explained along the same lines as the argument in Section 3.2. 45 As we have seen in Section 3.2, the policy prole that induces the most informative data under centralization is diverse policies. While under decentralization, uniform policies induces the most informative data.
It is important to note that Proposition 5.5 is obtained under the assumption that the inoce payo is linear in the incumbent's reputation. Other specications of in-oce payo (e.g. those that satisfy conditions in Lemma 3.3) can be robust to the observability of policy choices. We showed in previous drafts that the rent-extraction payo as described at the end of Section 3.3 is one such specication.
Non-Bayesian Updating
Thus far in our paper, voters are assumed to be Bayesian-rational. That is, they process information and update their beliefs via the Bayes' rule. Yet, there is a large body of 45 This force is also behind the ndings of Hermalin (1993) , who showed in a standard career-concerns model with observable actions that a risk averse agent has an incentive to choose actions that are less informative. literature in psychology that documents a variety of systematic biases in the way people process information and form beliefs.
46 In this section, we explore the implications of some of the biases in probabilistic judgment. In particular, we show that our characterization of equilibrium policy prole is robust to several known biases.
We consider rst biases on how voters update their beliefs. More specically, we consider the situation where the voters overweight the prior or the data in forming the posterior.
Studies in experimental psychology have shown that people often exhibit conservatism in updating their beliefs (see Edwards (1968) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) ). In other words, people's beliefs move insuciently in response to data. Interestingly, there is also experimental evidence suggests that people sometimes place too much emphasis on the data when updating their beliefs. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) demonstrate what is now known as the law of small numbers; they show that people tend to exaggerate the amount of information contained in a small sample. There is also much evidence of the socalled base rate neglect, where people under appreciate the base rate of incidence in updating (see Tversky and Kahneman (1985) ).
We can incorporate the biases discussed above by generalizing the formula voters use to Proof. The result follows from Lemma 3.3 and its corollary. In particular, one can treat ηs as an increasing transformation of the Bayesian posterior expectation, which is itself a constant multiple of s. Therefore, Corollary 3.1 applies. 46 See Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) for an excellent introduction on the subject.
Another type of bias in probabilistic judgment we consider is on how voters interpret and process information. In the context of our model, information in a given situation is encapsulated by a sucient statistic. A Bayesian-rational voter would use sucient statistics that are specic linear combinations of the district outputs. For example, under centralization, the Bayesian voter would treat the average of the district outputs as the sucient statistic.
A voter who suers from biases in processing information may use the wrong formula for the sucient statistic. As an example, consider the salience eect which describes the tendency for people to put more weight on more memorable or salient evidence (see Tversky and Kahneman (1973) ). In the context of our model, the salience eect may manifest as voters putting a greater weight on their own district's output when formulating the sucient statistic. To illustrate, the voter in district d may use ( 47 For example, under centralization, voter know that a high output in either district is a signal for high competence. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the decentralization vs. centralization debate by examining how policy experimentation diers under the two systems. We also consider the resulting welfare implications in terms of policy learning as well as electoral accountability. We show that policy experimentation, as measured by the variety of policies implemented, is greater under decentralization than under centralization. This provides a theoretical foundation to the popular notion of policy laboratories. Moreover, this observation holds even when voters suer from various biases in probabilistic judgment. This suggests that the institutional arrangement is a far more important factor than a sophisticated electorate in determining policymakers' incentives for experimentation.
Our normative analysis provides novel insights into district homogeneity and voters' information. In particular, district homogeneity favors decentralization in terms of policy learning and electoral accountability. This observation runs counter to the established view that decentralization is most suitable when districts are dissimilar. This contrast reects a tradeo between voters' information and preference matching. Heterogeneous districts suggest a need for policy exibility as provided by decentralization, but on the other hand, voters' information and learning would suer under decentralization.
Finally, we believe that some of our results can be applied to settings other than political economy. One such setting is the organizational design of rms. We believe this is an appropriate setting to apply our insights because the compensation schemes for managers and employees in many rms have the bonuses and limited liability feature. Consider the upor-out practice found in many professional rms: the employee's performance is evaluated at some interval and the employee is either promoted or laid-o. Moreover, the employee's payo conditional promotion would depend on past performances. In this case, our observations can be translated to predictions about the managers' choices of risky projects and the selection and screening of managers under dierent organizational structures. These types of results have not received much attention in the existing literature on the organization of rms (e.g., Farrell, 1987 and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008) , which has focused mainly on the tradeo between coordination and adaptation. We consider this a fruitful avenue for future research.
